Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fourth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.

Now, we are pleased to present one of the essays selected for Honorable Mention, from Mark R. Patridge, a student at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Introduction

At the heart of Carl von Clausewitz’s masterpiece, On War, there stands a scientific metaphor—a three-way magnetic pendulum—that defines in terms as comprehensive as possible the entire phenomenon of war, an unchanging structure within which an infinite variety of behaviors can arise.[1] With this mental model—the famous trinity of passion, reason, and chance—On War provides a holistic understanding of the environment in which individual military commanders must devise and exercise strategy. Where Clausewitz begins, however, the policy maker has already acted: “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”[2] How can we understand the cognitive universe within which policy makers must make their decisions and exercise their judgment, and in which military professionals must offer their advice and take their guidance in order to link tactical actions to strategic objectives? For this task, civilian and military decision makers alike need a more coherent mental model. Only then can they develop the necessary holistic perspective on the phenomenon of statecraft to enable them to differentiate and decide among the myriad possible decisions and outcomes that may arise from circumstances prevailing at any given moment. Such a theory can find its own scientific metaphor, defining the realm of the possible without predicting actual decisions, in the modern biological theory of evolution.[3]

Theory notwithstanding, the mixed results of United States military intervention has demonstrated America’s armed forces, and the United States at large, lack a coherent understanding of strategy and need a better mental model for framing strategic problems. For example, at the outset of the civil war in Syria under the Obama administration the official policy of the United States was regime change in Syria. Regardless of the other issues in the region, the constraints of the Syrian problem created a dilemma for both policy makers and military strategists: How can regime change occur in the absence of a direct approach in the pursuit of an annihilation strategy?[4] Clearly the nonlinear, interactively complex problem of Syria and instability in the Levant cannot be reduced to such a rudimentary prescriptive construct. Military strategy or great power conflict strategy cannot be categorized as simply irrelevance, attrition, or annihilation. A marriage of modern scientific observation and historical critique can offer a much more useful, inclusive, and expansive framework. An understanding of this expanded set of possibilities must rest first on a grasp of both the general problem of inconsistency within the current state of international relations (IR) theory and the particular problem of accounting for the state’s anticipation of the future operating environment.

To explain the problem that requires the use of evolutionary biology as a mental model or conceptual framework, it is necessary first to examine the limitations of the current dominant theories of international relations. Given the expansive and almost all-inclusive range of study, Liberalism, Realism, and their various derivatives such as Institutionalism and Constructivism struggle to offer inclusive, plausible explanations for the state and state behavior. Whether through historical case studies, or regressive statistical analysis, theorists of international relations seek to divine causal relationships to explain behaviors and outcomes. International relations theories are not mutually inclusive; each is based on different subjective perspectives concerning their analysis or problem framing. Their analytical outcomes are limited in their quantitative and qualitative accuracy by only those elements of systems deemed important (rational actors, institutions, internal domestic influences, etc). Just as the theory of quantum mechanics describes the paradox of light exhibiting both particle and wave type behaviors, in this way, each theory of international relations generates conclusions that are both right and wrong. While different theories may produce non-congruent system schematics and process diagrams that reach congruent conclusions, each product individually fails to address strategic problem framing from a comprehensive objective perspective accounting for an entire body of observable facts.

Risks and Opportunities in Evolution’s Application

As advances in the other sciences came to the forefront in the wake of World War II and the dawn of the nuclear age, the influence of biological sciences waned. “Theorists draw ideas and legitimacy from the most culturally authoritative sciences of the time.”[5] Due to the ill-conceived and pervasive effects of Social Darwinism in western culture and its impact on shaping the destructive path towards World War I, the theory of evolution ceded the limelight as a comparative mirror in international relations. However, Pandora could not put On the Origin of Species back in the box. Despite the stigma associated with evolution in international relations, its untapped power as a theory for change remains.

Inasmuch as biology has been a historical influence in shaping theory outside of the physical sciences, the modern application of evolution and biological concepts is still rife with intellectual landmines. Whereas Duncan Bell suggests caution regarding the utility of hard sciences in international relations, Richard Lebow states flatly, “Bad ideas are hard to kill.”[6] Lebow’s criticism of various theorists’ recent endeavors to commandeer evolution and evolutionary psychology invokes the idea of unctuous travelling salesmen and crackpots peddling half-baked theories as miracle medicines for international woes. He states, “Social Darwinism periodically resurfaces in a new guise...[and] social scientists in the rational choice tradition must resort to the most extreme forms of intellectual prestidigitation” when devising the foundation of their evolutionary theories.[7] Common to both Bell and Lebow is the acknowledgement of the contemporary allure of finding a false panacea and the, “long-standing practice of applying successful frameworks in science to the social world whether or not they have much relevance.”[8] But for all of Lebow’s criticism of current evolutionary applications he does acknowledge, “Are there any possible applications of evolution to history and politics? Yes, but in a metaphorical sense only.”[9]

Just as biologists continued the methodical revision and improvement of evolutionary theory, theorists in international relations renewed their tentative attempts in the applicability of evolution.[10] Ian Lustick contends “political scientists have largely failed to engage seriously with evolutionary theory,” especially within the historical analysis of institutional change.[11] Political scientists have compartmentalized and denigrated evolution to an oversimplified synonym for development, progress, gradualism or simply change. Unlike Lebow’s short-sighted commentary based on a basic understanding of Darwin’s descent with modification, Lustick searches for a higher conceptual understanding of evolution within the political realm. To Lustick, evolution’s defining characteristic is that “in relation to circumstances, patterns of change observed among units produce subsequent patterns of population change.”[12] His application of evolution’s concepts allows for a mechanism-agnostic view while avoiding any implied biases of progress. He also leaves open the possibility of deductive analysis for systemically complex and emergent macro patterns at various unitary levels.

Other theorists such as Orion Lewis and Sven Stienmo delve into the applicability of evolution as a general theory. Lewis and Stienmo cite Richard Dawkins’s work in coining the phrase Universal Darwinism, “which refers to the notion that evolutionary processes can be reduced to a very simple algorithm: variation, selection, retention.”[13] Evolution as an algorithm can serve as a simple method for strategy development. Eric Beinhocker encapsulates this idea in that, “like gravity, evolution is a universal phenomenon, meaning that no matter whether the algorithm is running in the substrate of biological DNA, a computer program, the economy, or the substrate of an alien biology on a distant planet, evolution will follow certain general laws in its behavior.”[14] This insight completely negates the assertions of Bell and Lebow that the application of biological theories are either irrelevant or simply neo-Social Darwinists attempting to deceive academia through intellectual sleight of hand. Bell and Lebow would attest that the cognitive and philosophical elements of politics and culture go beyond the explanation of simple, reductionist biologists. However, ecological environments are no less non-linearly and interactively complex at scale than systems of interest to international relations.

Within the scientific community the theory of evolution is as scientifically true as germ theory, atomic theory, quantum theory, or heliocentric theory. The United States National Academy of Sciences states, “The past and continuing occurrence of evolution is a scientific fact. Because the evidence supporting it is so strong, scientists no longer question whether biological evolution has occurred and is continuing to occur. Instead, they investigate the mechanisms of evolution, how rapidly evolution can take place, and related questions.”[15] The conceptual framework for evolution as an explanation for change over time is a significantly vetted and grounded conclusion within biology. Unlike the misguided use of evolution by Social Darwinists as a euphemism for discrimination and racial progress, evolution as a broader theory of change over time is a potentially viable conceptual framework across multiple academic disciplines.

A Biological Approach to Problem Framing and Strategy

A holistic understanding of policy making is as essential as understanding of warfighting itself for a military professional. The creation and conduct of strategy depend on a firm grasp of policy, even as the uniformed officer serves as a vital adviser to civilian decision makers in the first place. Policy and strategy are inextricably intertwined. However, whereas Clausewitz does address a multitude of important facets of the nature and character of war and warfare, he leaves open, by design, a number of gaps and assumptions concerning the nature and character of policy, as well as how to devise it. This idea is reflected in MCDP 1-1, Strategy: “[P]olicy, while it is different from politics, is produced via a political process...the military professional who says, ‘Keep politics out of this. Just give us the policy, and we will take care of the strategy,’ does not understand the fundamentals of strategy. Strategists must operate within the constraints of policy and politics.”[16] Aside from operating within the framework of policy, as a subordinate subject matter expert in military operations, the military professional must assist in informing the political process of devising policy. Clausewitz states, “If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration.”[17] The relationship between policy executor and policy maker is a feedback loop much like command and control within a military hierarchy. Regardless of the policy outcome, if the military—or, for that matter, any instrument of national power—is to execute policy effectively and as intended, statesmen, analysts, and military leaders must be able to communicate through a common medium and think around a common framework.

Important to this process is determining the basic definition of a state. In this construct the state is “a people permanently occupying a fixed territory bound together by common habits and custom into one body politic exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace and of entering into international relations with other states.”[18] The state, like an organism, is made up of constituent parts (people) organized to perform internal and external functions (government) held within the confines of a distinct membrane (territory) interacting with the environment (international relations, war and peace). These simple correlations between organisms and states form the basis for an analogous application of biological strategy and international relations. This is not a foreign construct imported from academia, for the Marine Corps has woven the ideas of evolution and ecology into its doctrine (i.e., Warfighting and Strategy) as well as its professional military education classes to varying degrees (e.g., Evolution of Warfare since 1945 and Evolving National Security Concepts and Operations, both at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College). The modern biological concepts of evolution and ecology are highly pertinent in providing the necessary framework for policy making or strategy.

Biological Ends

Evolution has a number of demarcation points that serve as distinct outcomes and describe the dominant essential state of being for a species. These outcomes are adaptation, speciation, extinction, and coevolution. In an international relations context, the four evolutionary states are not literally identical to their biological equivalents. By envisioning the state as a species-like entity, we can nonetheless take these four outcomes as foundational for the categorical description of the state system. Evolution serves as a foundational baseline for the desired ends or outcomes of state policy. A number of these outcomes are interchangeable, such as adaptation and coevolution. In these two ends, there is in fact no end to the original entity, but rather a transition into an altered state, whether solo or in symbiosis with another state organism. Speciation and extinction, however, are finite outcomes where the flow of a state’s development either begins anew or terminates altogether.

*Evolutionary Relationships (Author’s Work)*

Speciation and extinction are the most complex outcomes in an evolutionary description of international relations. In the simplest terms, extinction is the dissolution of the state as it was, and it will never exist again. History is littered with examples of extinct states. The Roman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire; they are all extinct states. Parts and pieces of these great empires will live on in the descendant states emerging in the wake of their dissolution (much as biological elements of the dinosaurs can be found in birds and reptiles today). Their culture, people, and government, however, are part of the archaeological record; there will never be an exact recreation of that historical system and that specific combination of elements.

Speciation and extinction are linked ideas. The essential idea behind speciation is that a change engine has driven a state or any number of adjacent states beyond the ability to maintain their identity or homeostatic balance and forced the number of relevant constituent polities to reconfigure into one or more new states. New states can form not only as a result of or in combination with the extinction of a parent state, but also without the extinction of the parent state. Whereas extinction describes the finite end of a parent state, speciation entails a situation where either a parent or multiple parent states entirely transition into something completely new and fundamentally different from the previous parent state or states, or only pieces of the original state(s) do so. For instance, speciation can describe the occurrence of multiple states combining to form a new consolidated state (e.g., Germany). It also describes the situation where elements of the state fragment and drift away from their parent state to form one or more new states (e.g., Ireland). Speciation can also occur due to the complete dissolution or extinction of the parent state (e.g., Yugoslavia).

Adaptation and coevolution both pertain to outcomes where the constituent states maintain their identity. However, there is a cost associated with this continuity in incurred risk. Two or more states that enter into coevolution begin a mutual arrangement whereby each state attempts to sustain itself in spite of the passage of time and minor changes but does so by means of a relationship with another state. Coevolution can be either cooperative or competitive in nature. Similar to the gut flora in mammalian species or the predator/prey relationships between snow leopards and rabbits, states can become tightly coupled and dependent upon each other for survival. Should a major element of the environment change the dynamics of the codependent relationship, the future of each state can oscillate towards speciation or extinction.

Whereas coevolution is specific to the relationship a state maintains with another state, adaptation is the state’s selective retention of advantageous attributes according to the environment. The problem inherent within adaptation is that the environment is subject to change just as much as the internal or external relationships of the state. Just as coevolution may drive a state towards dependency on another state for survival, adaptation can drive a state down a road of specialization where it becomes dependent on the dynamics of the external environment—or, to put it more precisely, the ecological system within which it exists—to survive. Such systemic dependencies present their own risks.

According to MCDP 1-1, “Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and means, the product—that is, the strategy—is a specific way of using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus both a process and a product.”[19] In deconstructing the elements of strategy, we see that the outcomes of evolution described above best encapsulate the desired outcomes of state policy—to be precise, the desired future ends of the state itself. In choosing one’s future desired state, in turn, one must identify a way to get there. The various kinds of symbiotic relations in ecology—described in detail later—can express the ways states and non-state actors relate amongst themselves and to each other.

Biological Ways

Beyond understanding the categorical ends that describe a state’s evolution, it is important to understand the way in which a state can find itself pushed to one end or another. The ways in which species can interact is very much similar to the ways in which states can react to each other or the environment. Roger Masters in his “Biological Nature of the State” outlines “five possible kinds of behavior (asociality, nepotism, mutual benefit, sociality and mutual harm)” states can choose.[20] Understanding this dynamic and based on a quantitative analysis, Masters uses a combination of game theory and inclusive fitness strategies to generate his theory on the five different kinds of behavior.[21] His definitions also serve as simple and succinct methods of qualitatively describing the number of options available for evolutionary outcomes in state behavior. Ecology offers an explanation and categorization similar to Masters’ theory but with a minor exception; Masters focuses on only the possible gain or loss of a state interaction, while ecology provides for additional neutral outcomes.

State interactions are similar to chess where the movement and exchange of pieces can have positive, negative, or neutral impacts on either player. The types of symbiotic relationships defined within ecology—amensalism, commensalism, mutualism, parasitism, neutralism, and competition—best describe the ways in which states and non-state actors can relate.[22] These ways describe the relationship not only with another state but also with the environment. The figure below graphically represents the potential outcomes of interactions. In this example Species A and Species B can be substituted with any combination of State A, State B, and/or non-State actor C. These combinations can be infinitely and complexly woven together between a multitude of states and non-state actors across various sectors of interaction such as trade, immigration, intelligence sharing, etc. In this way interactions can be individually described and collectively generalized.

Biological Means

Finally, means in this theory are simply defined. They are the given elements of the environment and circumstances; in most basic terms, they comprise the characteristics of the state or non-state actor that relate to the instruments of power on which will depend the future of the state or non-state actor itself in the international arena: diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. In assessing the environment and the means or resources available and pairing them or observing them through ecological ways, statesmen can achieve a more propensed intentionality towards a desired evolutionary outcome. It is possible to say one may arrive at any of these outcomes or categories unintentionally, or without forethought, but the point of understanding the ecological and evolutionary analogy is to be more intentional in choosing a desired outcome in the first place.

Thus, the outcomes of evolution form a solid basis for understanding the ends of state policy; the types of symbiotic relationships defined within ecology best describe the ways in which states and non-state actors can relate while the elements of national power describe the means of strategy as both process and product. Genetic experimentation with the intent of human evolution possesses a connotation of immorality and taboo. However, the generation of new means for the state organism is not only common—it is a moral imperative. Understanding national strategy via an evolutionary and ecological context, it is the state’s creative responsibility to develop either the means to act in the categorical combination chosen or find a categorical combination of ways to leverage the means available to the state.

Adaptedness

In biology, the concept of adaptation is used to describe not only an evolutionary process but also a state of being or a trait in organisms. Success within the construct of evolution and adaptation is not simply living and passing on traits or genetic material to the next generation; it is finding a niche and possessing the resiliency to maintain fitness while in a constantly fluctuating ecosystem. Biological fitness can be quantitatively measured in the frequency of a desirable or beneficial phenotype when compared to its ability to pass on its traits to subsequent generations in a population. As states are not exact homologies to organisms but likenesses, phenotypes or expressed traits can be compared to the arsenal of state means and subsequent generations are the ability of a state to retain or regenerate the knowledge or physical capacity to use an element within that arsenal. Therefore, a state’s fitness can be measured through the presence of currently relevant means and the retention or regeneration of those means for future use as conditions change.

Aside from creating or possessing a capability (adaptation) equally important is the speed of creation and proliferation compared to the rate of change. Resiliency and adaptability are related ideas essential to the description of not only the ability of an organism to generate or adopt new traits, but also the speed at which an organism can change its fitness to accommodate new environmental conditions.[24] In similar fashion, a state’s adaptability refers to the capability of a state to develop novel means relevant to change. As biological adaptedness is both a state of being (fitness) and the ability to change (adaptable), national adaptedness encompasses both the state of being fit to a set of conditions as well as the ability to change in response to those same factors.

Survival, Game Theory, and Strategy

States face many complicated circumstances, and leaders must constantly make not only difficult decisions concerning the present and present outcomes, but also decisions concerning the most appropriate present actions in anticipation of future contingencies. Formulating strategies for now and the future must allow for the predictable and unpredictable similar to military operational plans consideration of an adversary’s most likely and most dangerous course of action. Probabilities and possibilities must be examined not only for the sake of national survival but also for the sake of national adaptedness. To describe and predict the probable flow of national fitness, adaptability, and survival, one must pair the concept of evolution with game theory. The fundamental desire of any state is to survive and endure in spite of internal or external conditions. Applying game theory to the punctuated and enduring desires of the state, national survival can be described as a finite game within the infinite game of national adaptedness.

The state leader who fails to understand national survival and adaptedness in this way may win one and only one finite game, while failing to meet the subsequent ante requirements of the next hand. In an infinite game, nothing is sacred. Players and rules are fluid. However, in finite games, the players and rules are set. Instead of attempting to play only a finite game, predicting the future from the past and forcing other nations to play by an agreed upon set of rules, policy makers need to recognize combined implications of evolutionary, ecological and game theory.

Conclusion

Statesmen and military professionals must accept an overarching, common theory of change.[25] Like Darwin’s theory, this international relations theory is meant to describe, categorically, both the outcomes of change and the ways in which change can occur for a state. Moreover, like Darwin’s theory, this conceptual approach leaves open the opportunity for future scholars to investigate the specific underlying means and mechanisms of change. Central to the shortfalls of current international relations theory is a focus on foundationally biased, linear causation. Beyond the varied preconceived assumptions of international relations theory, causation is only one element of change and subject to the pitfalls of wrongful correlation and covariance. The ultimate utility of this theory is to provide an inclusive conceptual model that supports and informs judgement in maintaining the adaptedness of the state without requiring the causal assumptions of a single theory. Theorists of international relations must look at change as a complicated relationship between cause, consequence and the emergent probability between them.

The goal of any species in the process of evolution, like the state, is to effectively manage finite games while still competing in an infinite game. Being found flat footed and ignorant to this process risks a nation’s livelihood. To maintain national survival a state must develop strategies that avoid cumulative change to the point of extinction or speciation. Essential to this feat, national adaptedness recognizes not only the infinite potential of the state, but the importance of resiliency or fitness within a constant state of change. Past controversy notwithstanding, biological metaphors have served for millennia as effective comparative devices. Modified contextually to fit within international relations, modern biological evolutionary theory and ecology offer an objective theory of change that supports a systemic and holistic grasp of problem framing and strategy.

Mark R. Patridge is a Marine Corps officer and a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College graduate currently serving as a future operations planner with Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve. In addition to his Master’s of Military Studies, he holds a Bachelor’s of Science in Biological Sciences from The George Washington University as well as a Master’s of Science in Cybersecurity Technology from the University of Maryland. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect the official position of the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Evolution (Shutterstock)

Notes:

[1] War, the author writes, hovers among the three magnets of “Passion,” “Reason,” and “Chance.” As physicists know, any object in such a contraption will swing wildly, never repeating its pattern. The device that Clausewitz observed was what physicists today would call a Random Oscillating Magnetic Pendulum (ROMP.)

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 87.

[3] Although there may be additional applications for ecological and evolutionary theory within the military such as the various military planning processes, the intent and focus of this paper is on statecraft, specifically policy as a product of national strategy.

[4] MCDP 1-1, Strategy, delineates regime change as an unlimited political objective. According to Strategy, unlimited political objectives necessitate unlimited military means and a strategy of annihilation. United States Marine Corps, Strategy. MCDP; 1-1, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), https://libraryofthemarinecorps.on.worldcat.org/oclc/39699234, 57.

[5] Bell, "Beware of False Prophets: Biology, Human Nature and the Future of International Relations Theory".

[6] Richard N. Lebow, "You Can’t Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations", International Politics Reviews 1, no. 1 (1 Sep, 2013): 2-10, doi:10.1057/ipr.2013.2, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2090670047.

[7] Lebow, "You Can’t Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations."

[8] Duncan Bell, "Beware of False Prophets: Biology, Human Nature and the Future of International Relations Theory", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82, no. 3 (2006): 493-510, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3874264.Bell; Lebow, "You Can’t Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations."

[9] Lebow, "You Can’t Keep a Bad Idea Down: Evolutionary Biology and International Relations."

[10] Even though Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace performed decades of research to distill their observations into a coherent thesis, their ground-breaking ideas were still only partially complete - Darwin and Wallace could not explain the more intricate details of the underlying mechanisms in evolution. Not until biologists discovered DNA, Mendelian Genetics and the Chromosomal Theory of Inheritance could evolution be understood fully. Leveraging achievements across academia and the breakneck pace of technological advance, biology has surged back to prominence at the end of the twentieth century.

[11] Ian S. Lustick, "Taking Evolution Seriously: Historical Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory", Polity 43, no. 2 (2011): 179-209, http://www.jstor.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/stable/23015151.

[12] Lustick, "Taking Evolution Seriously: Historical Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory".

[13] Orion A. Lewis and Sven Steinmo, "How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional Change", Polity 44, no. 3 (2012): 314-339, http://www.jstor.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/stable/41684491.

[14] Lewis and Steinmo, "How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional Change".

[15] US Academy of Sciences "Is Evolution a Theory or a Fact?", National Academy of the Sciences, Accessed March 25, 2019, http://www.nas.edu/evolution/TheoryOrFact.html.

[16] United States Marine Corps, Strategy, 13.

[17] Clausewitz, On War, 87.

[18] West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. S.v., "state," Retrieved April 26 2019 from https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/state.

[19] United States Marine Corps, Strategy. MCDP; 1-1, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), https://libraryofthemarinecorps.on.worldcat.org/oclc/39699234, 37.

[20] Roger D. Masters "The Biological Nature of the State." World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 161-193. doi:10.2307/2010269. http://www.jstor.org.lomc.idm.oclc.org/stable/2010269.

[21] Roger D. Masters "The Biological Nature of the State.".

[22] Amensalism is an interaction where one of the states is destroyed or marginalized while the other is not affected. Commensalism allows one state to benefit while the other is neither significantly harmed nor helped. Mutualism describes a situation where both states benefit from their interaction. Parasitism allows one state to benefit at the expense of another. Neutralism occurs when neither state is significantly impacted positively or negatively. Competition leads to both states being mutually negatively impacted through the interaction.

[23] Ian Alexander. Symbiotic Relationships Diagram. Accessed March 6, 2019. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Symbiotic_relationships_diagram.svg.

[24] Brian Walker, C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig. 2004. Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems. Ecology and Society 9(2): 5. Accessed May 31, 2020. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5.

[25] Using this biological theory as a lens it is possible to analyze via case study and apply in planning exercises in both the retrospective method of Clausewitz’s probabilistic Kritik but also the anticipatory insight of Sun Tzu’s Shih. Both authors are trying to inculcate sound judgement concerning future possible outcomes. Where the former bases judgement on the study of the past, the latter relies on natural observation to determine present propensities. By discerning change over time through this lens, the statesman learns how to manipulate the present towards a desired future.